Tort Reform and Jury Instructions by Adams, Charles W
University of Tulsa College of Law
TU Law Digital Commons
Articles, Chapters in Books and Other Contributions to Scholarly Works
2015
Tort Reform and Jury Instructions
Charles W. Adams
University of Tulsa College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/fac_pub
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Torts Commons
This article originally appeared at volume 86, page 821 of the Oklahoma Bar Journal.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles, Chapters in Books
and Other Contributions to Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
daniel-bell@utulsa.edu.
Recommended Citation
86 Okla. B.J. 821 (2015).
Vol. 86 — No. 11 — 4/18/2015 The Oklahoma Bar Journal 821
The Civil OUJI Committee determined that 
both statutes raised possible constitutional 
issues, and so, decided to flag these issues in its 
recommendations to the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court. The committee comments to the pro-
posed jury instruction on nontaxability of dam-
ages awards pointed out that there were 
instances when damages for personal injury 
awards were taxable and that there may be a 
constitutional question whether Okla. Stat. 
Title 12, §577.4 violated the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers. The Civil OUJI Committee pre-
sented two alternatives for the proposed jury 
instruction on the $350,000 cap on noneconom-
ic losses for personal injuries. The first alterna-
tive followed the language of Okla. Stat. Title 
23, §61.2 and did not inform the jury of the 
$350,000 cap on noneconomic losses, but it 
noted a constitutional question in the commit-
tee comments to the jury instruction. The sec-
ond alternative informed the jury of the 
$350,000 cap on noneconomic losses, contrary 
to a provision in Okla. Stat. Title 23, §61.2, and 
it explained the reason for doing so in the com-
mittee comments to the jury instruction and 
verdict form.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court did not adopt 
the proposed jury instruction on nontaxability 
of damages awards or either alternative for the 
$350,000 cap on noneconomic losses that the 
Civil OUJI Committee had proposed. Without 
having the benefit of actual cases before it, the 
Supreme Court declined to resolve the possible 
constitutional issues raised by the two statutes. 
This article provides a brief discussion of the 
possible constitutional issues that are raised by 
the two statutes, and it includes the text of the 
proposed recommendations that the Civil OUJI 
Committee presented to the Oklahoma Su-
preme Court. 
NONTAXABILITY OF AWARDS FOR 
PERSONAL INJURIES AND 
WRONGFUL DEATH
The only case in which the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court has addressed the issue of 
whether a jury instruction on the taxability of 
an award of damages should be given is Mis-
souri-K.T.R.R. v. Miller.1 The case was brought 
under the Federal Employers Liability Act 
(FELA), and on appeal, the defendant argued 
that the trial court erred by admitting evidence 
of the plaintiff’s gross income without giving 
instructions on the income tax on future earn-
ings. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that 
the income tax consequences of the injury and 
the award should not be considered by the 
Tort Reform and Jury Instructions
By Charles W. Adams
SCHOLARLY ARTICLE 
This article discusses two recent statutes and the efforts of the Oklahoma Committee on Uniform Jury Instructions (Civil OUJI Committee) to recommend uniform jury instructions 
based on these statutes to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The first 
statute is Okla. Stat. Title 12, §577.4, which deals with an instruc-
tion to juries that awards for damages for personal injuries and 
wrongful death that are nontaxable. The second statute is Okla. 
Stat. Title 23, §61.2, which imposes a $350,000 cap on noneconom-
ic losses for personal injuries.
822 The Oklahoma Bar Journal Vol. 86 — No. 11 — 4/18/2015
jury.2 The original edition of the Oklahoma 
Uniform Jury Instructions (OUJI) provided at 
Instruction No. 4.17, which was titled “Effect of 
Income Tax on Award of Damages: ‘No Instruc-
tion Should Be Given’.” The comment to In-
struction No. 4.17 stated: “In Missouri-K.T.R.R 
v. Miller, 486 P.2d 630, 636 (Okla. 1971), the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that the 
income tax consequences of injury and award 
are not a proper consideration for the jury.” 
Instruction No. 4.17 was not changed until 
2014.
The Oklahoma Legislature adopted Okla. 
Stat. Title 12, §577.4 in 2011. It provides: 
The Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions 
(OUJI) applicable in a civil case shall 
include an instruction notifying the jury 
that no part of an award for damages for 
personal injury or wrongful death is sub-
ject to federal or state income tax. Any 
amount that the jury determines to be 
proper compensation for personal injury or 
wrongful death should not be increased or 
decreased by any consideration for income 
taxes. In order to be admitted at trial, any 
exhibit relating to damage awards shall 
reflect accurate tax ramifications. 
This statute is unusual because it is directed 
to the content of the OUJI, rather than the law 
that governs in the state courts. In addition, it 
involves the effect of federal income tax law, 
rather than state law. Although in most cases, 
damages for personal injuries are not subject to 
federal income tax, there are circumstances 
where they may be taxable. For example, if a 
taxpayer had deducted medical expenses in a 
previous tax year, a recovery for medical 
expenses would be taxable.3 In addition, unlike 
compensatory damages for personal injuries, 
punitive damages are taxable, but the jury 
would not be aware of this distinction unless it 
was instructed on it. Moreover, the statute 
refers only to the taxability of a damages 
award to a plaintiff, but it does not address 
whether a damages award would be deduct-
ible by a defendant. The statute is also prob-
lematic, because it directs that juries must be 
informed that damages awards for personal 
injuries are not taxable, thereby inviting them 
to consider income taxes, but then it states that 
juries must not increase or decrease their 
awards on account of any consideration for 
income taxes. Finally, instructing juries on the 
applicable law in a case is a judicial function, 
rather than a legislative function, and there-
fore, section 577.4 may violate the separation of 
powers doctrine in the Okla. Const., Art. 4, §1. 
The Civil OUJI Committee submitted the fol-
lowing proposed revisions to Instruction 4.174 
to the Oklahoma Supreme Court in 2012:
Instruction No. 4.17
Effect Of Income Tax On Award Of Damages
NO INSTRUCTION SHOULD BE GIVEN
[Name of Plaintiff] will not be required 
to pay any federal or state income taxes on 
any amount that you award for damages 
for (personal injury)/(wrongful death). 
[This rule does not apply to [the portion of] 
the claim of [Name of Plaintiff] for [speci-
fy those claims that are subject to federal 
or state income taxes]]. You should not 
add to or subtract from the amount, if any, 
you determine to be proper compensation 
for (personal injury)/(wrongful death) 
because of income taxes.
Notes on Use
This Instruction should be given only in 
cases where the damages sought for per-
sonal injury or wrongful death are nontax-
able. The second sentence that is shown in 
brackets should be given if there are claims 
or portions of a claim that are taxable so 
that the jury instruction will not be inac-
curate or confusing to the jury. The trial 
court should decide what damages are or 
are not subject to income tax based on the 
circumstances of the particular case.
 The statute is also 
problematic, because it directs that 
juries must be informed that 
damages awards for personal 
injuries are not taxable, thereby 
inviting them to consider income 
taxes, but then it states that juries 
must not increase or decrease 
their awards on account of any con-
sideration for income taxes.  
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Comments
This Instruction is included on account of 
12 O.S. 2011 §577.4. See also 26 U.S.C. 
§104(a)(2) (damages for personal physical 
injuries, other than punitive damages, are 
not taxable). The exclusion for damages for 
personal physical injuries covers not only 
medical bills but also amounts awarded for 
pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment, and 
lost earnings. See C.I.R. v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 
323, 329 (1995) (dictum); Martin J. McMa-
hon, Jr. & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Fed. Inc. 
Tax’n of Indiv. ¶7.03 (2011) (“When the 
exclusion [for damages for personal physi-
cal injuries] applies, it covers all elements 
of actual damages — nonpecuniary dam-
ages (pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment, 
and the like, medical expenses, and lost 
wages).”). Amounts received for personal 
injuries are taxable, however, to the extent 
that they are attributable to deductions 
allowed for medical and other similar 
expenses. See 26 CFR Part 1 §1.104-1 (a). In 
addition, damages for emotional distress 
are taxable unless the emotional distress is 
attributable to a physical injury. Id. §1-104 
(c). This brief summary of the federal and 
state tax law is not exhaustive. 
In Missouri-K.T. R.R. v. Miller, 1971 OK 68, 
¶38, 486 P.2d 630, 636 (Okla. 1971), the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that the 
income tax consequences of injury and 
award are not a proper consideration for 
the jury. There may be a question whether 
12 O.S. 2011 §577.4 violates the separation-
of-powers doctrine described in Yocum v. 
Greenbriar Nursing Home, 2005 OK 27, ¶13, 
130 P.3d 213, 220, as follows: 
Legislative power is mainly confined to 
making law, while the judiciary is invest-
ed primarily with an adjudicative func-
tion — the authority to hear and deter-
mine forensic disputes. A legislative 
removal of the discretionary component 
in adjudicative process is a usurpation 
of the courts’ freedom that is essential to 
the judiciary’s independence from the 
other two branches.
Instructing a jury on the applicable law in 
a case is a fundamental adjudicative func-
tion, rather than a legislative function.
In its order dated March 24, 2014,5 the Okla-
homa Supreme Court adopted the following 
revision to Instruction No. 4.17:
Instruction No. 4.17
Effect Of Income Tax On Award of Damages
NO INSTRUCTION SHOULD BE GIVEN
Comments
Title 12 O.S. 2011 §577.4 (Laws 2011, c. 16, 
§1, eff. Nov. 1, 2011), reads as follows: 
Tax Consequences of Award for Damag-
es in Personal Injury and Wrongful Death 
Actions
The Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions 
(OUJI) applicable in a civil case shall 
include an instruction notifying the jury 
that no part of an award for damages for 
personal injury or wrongful death is sub-
ject to federal or state income tax. Any 
amount that the jury determines to be 
proper compensation for personal injury or 
wrongful death should not be increased or 
decreased by any consideration for income 
taxes. In order to be admitted at trial, any 
exhibit relating to damage awards shall 
reflect accurate tax ramifications.
In Missouri-K.T.R.R. v. Miller, 1971 OK 68 
¶38, 486 P.2d 630, 636, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court ruled that the income tax 
consequences of a personal injury award 
are not a proper consideration for the jury.
While the Supreme Court’s order deleted the 
capitalized direction that no instruction should 
be given, it did not specify how the trial court 
should instruct the jury on the effect of income 
tax on the award of damages. The order quoted 
Okla. Stat. Title 12, §577.4 in the comments, 
and it also retained the prior comments, which 
cited the Missouri-K.T.R.R. case and stated that 
income tax consequences are not a proper sub-
ject for the jury. Instead of resolving how trial 
courts should instruct juries on the tax conse-
quences of damages awards, the Supreme 
Court gave mixed signals. Thus, it appears that 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court will require the 
issues surrounding the giving of jury instruc-
tions on the taxability of damages awards to be 
presented in the context of a justiciable contro-
versy,6 instead of in the context of reviewing 
proposed revisions to Instruction No. 4.17 from 
the Civil OUJI Committee, in order for it to 
resolve whether and how juries should be 
instructed on the tax consequences of damages 
awards. The standard of review on appeal for 
jury instructions “is whether the jury was mis-
led to the extent of rendering a different verdict 
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than it would have rendered, if the alleged 
errors had not occurred.”7 Seeking an extraor-
dinary writ in an original proceeding may be 
another means to obtain review by the Okla-
homa Supreme Court of jury instructions on 
the taxability of damages awards by the Okla-
homa Supreme Court.8 
THE $350,000 CAP ON DAMAGES FOR 
NONECONOMIC LOSS
The original version of Okla. Stat. Title 23, 
§61.2 was enacted in 2009 as part of the Com-
prehensive Lawsuit Reform Act.9 It provided 
for a $400,000 cap on damages, but it was con-
ditioned on the establishment of a Health Care 
Indemnity Fund, which would be used to pay 
damages for noneconomic losses in medical 
malpractice cases that exceeded the cap.10 The 
Health Care Indemnity Fund was never estab-
lished, but the requirement for it was removed 
when Okla. Stat. Title 12, §61.2 was amended in 
2011. In addition, the amount of the cap was 
reduced from $400,000 to $350,000.11 The statute 
also provides that there is no limit on the amount 
of noneconomic damages if the judge and jury 
determine by clear and convincing evidence that 
the defendant’s actions were in reckless disre-
gard for the rights of others, grossly negligent, 
fraudulent or intentional or with malice.12 
Jury instructions on how the jury should 
allocate damages between economic and non-
economic losses would certainly be needed if 
the jury’s award were to include noneconomic 
losses in excess of the $350,000 cap. The Civil 
OUJI Committee decided that the jury instruc-
tions should not have to be given in every case 
where a plaintiff sought more than $350,000 for 
total compensatory damages, however, because 
the plaintiff might not actually recover more 
than $350,000. The Civil OUJI Committee con-
cluded that jury instructions on the $350,000 
cap should be reserved for a second stage of 
the trial that would be held if the jury awarded 
more than $350,000 for total compensatory 
damages in the first stage. The Committee rec-
ognized, though, that whether to have two 
stages or a single stage was a matter for the 
trial court’s discretion. 
The next issue that the Civil OUJI Committee 
considered was whether the $350,000 cap 
should be applied to the damages that the jury 
determined were sustained by the plaintiff, or 
to the amount of the award after reduction for 
the percentage of the plaintiff’s comparative 
fault. The statute did not expressly address this 
issue, but the Civil OUJI Committee noted that 
paragraph B defined the $350,000 cap in terms 
of “the amount of compensation which a trier 
of fact may award a plaintiff for noneconomic 
loss” and paragraph D required the verdict to 
specify the “total compensatory damages recov-
erable by the plaintiff.” The Civil OUJI Commit-
tee concluded that this wording favored an 
interpretation that the $350,000 cap should be 
applied to the net amount after reduction for the 
percentage of the plaintiff’s comparative fault, 
because that amount was what the trier of fact 
would award the plaintiff and what would be 
recoverable by the plaintiff. 
The Civil OUJI Committee also addressed 
the constitutionality of Okla. Stat. Title 23, 
§61.2(F) of the statute, which provides:
F. In any civil action arising from claimed 
bodily injury which is tried to a jury, the 
jury shall not be instructed with respect to 
the limit on noneconomic damages set 
forth in subsection B of this section, nor 
shall counsel for any party, nor any witness 
inform the jury or potential jurors of such 
limitations.
Paragraph F appears to conflict with Article 
7, §15 of the Oklahoma Constitution, which 
provides: “In all jury trials the jury shall return 
a general verdict, and no law in force, nor any 
law hereafter enacted, shall require the court to 
direct the jury to make findings of particular 
questions of fact, but the court may, in its dis-
cretion, direct such special findings.” In Smith 
v. Gizzi,13 the Oklahoma Supreme Court ana-
lyzed how Article 7, §15 applied to the Okla-
homa comparative negligence statute,14 which 
provided for a plaintiff’s recovery to be dimin-
ished in proportion to a plaintiff’s negligence. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court decided that a 
special verdict was characterized by the jury 
being limited to making special findings and 
not knowing the legal effect of its answers.15 
The Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s use 
of a verdict that included special findings con-
cerning the percentage of negligence attribut-
able to both the plaintiff and defendant, because 
the jury instructions and verdict form informed 
the jury of the effect that the special findings 
would have on the outcome. The Supreme 
Court explained:
The jury not only must know the legal 
effect of its findings, but must determine 
the ultimate result, limited only by the spe-
cial findings as to each parties [sic] degree 
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of negligence. Such special findings are 
constitutionally and statutorily permitted. 
Under a general verdict, a jury must know 
the effect of its answers or it is not a gen-
eral verdict.16 
The problem presented by Okla. Stat. Title 23, 
§61.2(F) is that it states that the jury must not 
be instructed or informed with respect to the 
limit on noneconomic damages, and therefore, 
it appears to conflict with Okla. Const. Art. 7, 
§15, as interpreted by the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court in Smith v. Gizzi. 
As a result of the apparent conflict between 
Okla. Stat. Title 23, §61.2(F) and Okla. Const. 
Art. 7, §15, the Civil OUJI Committee submit-
ted to the Oklahoma Supreme Court two alter-
native versions of proposed jury instructions 
and verdict forms concerning the $350,000 cap 
on noneconomic loss. The first alternative did 
not refer to the $350,000 cap on noneconomic 
loss, but the comments to the jury explained 
that there was a potential question concerning 
the constitutionality of not instructing the jury 
with respect to the $350,000 cap on noneco-
nomic loss. The text of the first alternative is set 
out below.
Instruction No. 9.52 (First Alternative)
Supplemental Verdict Form
Specifying Economic and Noneconomic 
Losses
Directions
Now that you have returned a verdict in 
favor of [Plaintiff] in the amount of $ 
________ for the total compensatory dam-
ages for [Plaintiff], you must now make 
additional findings on the Supplemental 
Verdict Form. [On the Supplemental Ver-
dict Form, you must specify what portion 
of the total compensatory damages is for 
economic loss for [Plaintiff] and what por-
tion of the total compensatory damages is 
for noneconomic loss for [Plaintiff].] 
[First, you must decide whether or not 
you find by clear and convincing evidence 
that the conduct [was/(amounted to)] 
[(reckless disregard for the rights of oth-
ers)/(gross negligence)/fraud/(intentional 
or malicious)], and then indicate what you 
have decided with a check mark.] 
[“Reckless disregard of another’s rights” 
means that the defendant was either aware, 
or did not care, that there was a substantial 
and unnecessary risk that his, her or its 
conduct would cause serious injury to oth-
ers. In order for the conduct to be in reck-
less disregard of another’s rights, it must 
have been unreasonable under the circum-
stances and there must have been a high 
probability that the conduct would cause 
serious harm to another person.]
[“Gross negligence” means the want of 
slight care and diligence.]
[“Fraud” consists of the following acts 
committed with intent to deceive another 
party: (the suggestion, as a fact, of that 
which is not true, by one who does not 
believe it to be true)/ (the positive asser-
tion in a manner not warranted by the 
information of the person making it, of 
that which is not true, though he believe 
it to be true)/(the suppression of that 
which is true, by one having knowledge 
or belief of the fact)/(a promise made 
without any intention of performing it).]
[“Malice” involves hatred, spite or ill 
will, or the doing of a wrongful act inten-
tionally without just cause or excuse.]
[If you find by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the conduct [was/(amounted 
to)] [(reckless disregard for the rights of 
others)/(gross negligence)/fraud/(inten-
tional or malicious)], you must then speci-
fy what portion of the total compensatory 
damages is for economic loss for [Plaintiff] 
and what portion of the total compensato-
ry damages is for noneconomic loss for 
[Plaintiff].]
“Economic loss” means any type of 
financial harm, past or future, from a bodi-
ly injury including:
1. All wages, salaries or other compensa-
tion;
2. All costs for medical care or treatment, 
rehabilitation services, or other care, treat-
ment, services, products or accommoda-
tions, and
3. Any other costs on account of a bodily 
injury. 
“Noneconomic loss” means any type of 
nonfinancial harm from a bodily injury 
including damages for pain and suffering, 
loss of society, consortium, companion-
ship, care, assistance, attention, protection, 
advice, guidance, counsel, instruction, 
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training, education, disfigurement, mental 
anguish and any other intangible loss. 
Notes on Use
This Instruction and the following Sup-
plemental Verdict Form should be used if 
the jury has returned a verdict for personal 
injury to a plaintiff of more than $350,000 
after reduction for any percentage of com-
parative negligence. The trial court should 
list only the examples of economic and 
noneconomic loss and the definitions of 
fraud, gross negligence, intent, malice, and 
reckless disregard of another’s rights that 
are applicable. The trial court should in-
clude the paragraph of this instruction 
concerning the finding by clear and con-
vincing evidence with respect to the con-
duct of the defendant only if the applicable 
conduct of the defendant has been alleged 
and supported by proof at trial. 
If there have not been allegations of 
fraud, gross negligence, intent, malice, and 
reckless disregard of another’s rights, or 
they have not been supported by proof at 
trial, the trial court should include the sen-
tence of the first paragraph that appears in 
brackets, omit the next paragraphs that 
appear in brackets, and then give the defi-
nitions of economic and noneconomic loss 
in the instruction. On the other hand, if 
there have been allegations of fraud, gross 
negligence, intent, malice, and reckless dis-
regard of another’s rights that have been 
supported by proof at trial, the trial court 
should omit the sentence of the first para-
graph that appears in brackets, and then 
give the next paragraphs in brackets that 
are applicable along with the definitions of 
economic and noneconomic loss in the 
instruction. 
This instruction and the following Sup-
plemental Verdict Form contemplate a two 
stage process in which the jury would first 
return a verdict, and then if the verdict for 
bodily injury exceeds $350,000 after reduc-
tion for any comparative negligence of the 
plaintiff, the jury would then allocate the 
amount of compensatory damages between 
economic and noneconomic losses. If the 
verdict was for the defendant or did not 
exceed $350,000, it would be unnecessary 
for the jury to address the allocation be-
tween economic and noneconomic losses, 
and therefore, a two stage process would 
be more efficient than a single stage pro-
cess. Also, a two stage process could be less 
confusing for the jury if the jury was also 
determining comparative negligence. A 
single stage process might be more efficient 
in some cases, however, and then it would 
be appropriate for the trial court to exercise 
its discretion to consolidate the two stages 
into a single stage by combining the sub-
stance of this instruction and the Supple-
mental Form to the appropriate instruc-
tions and verdict forms. 
Comments
This instruction and the following Sup-
plemental Verdict Form conform to the 
requirements of 23 O.S. 2011 §61.2, which 
applies to actions filed on or after Nov. 1, 
2011. Id. §61.2(I). Section 61.2 requires the 
jury to return a general verdict accompa-
nied by interrogatories that specify the 
plaintiff’s total compensatory damages, 
and the portions of the total compensatory 
damages for economic and noneconomic 
loss. Id. §61.2(D). In addition, §61.2(E) re-
quires the jury to specify, if alleged, wheth-
er the conduct of the defendant was, or 
amounted to, reckless disregard for the 
rights of others, gross negligence, fraud, or 
intentional or malicious conduct. Section 
61.2(F) provides that the jury shall not be 
instructed with respect to the $350,000 lim-
it on noneconomic loss.
There may be a question concerning the 
constitutionality of not instructing the jury 
with respect to the limit on noneconomic 
damages. The Oklahoma Supreme Court 
addressed the application of Okla. Const. 
Art., VII, §15 to Oklahoma’s comparative 
negligence statutes in Smith v. Gizzi, 1977 
OK 91, 564 P.2d 1009. Art. VII, §15 pro-
vides: “In all jury trials the jury shall return 
a general verdict, and no law in force nor 
any law hereafter enacted, shall require the 
court to direct the jury to make findings of 
particular questions of fact but the court 
may, in its discretion, direct such special 
findings.” The Supreme Court held that the 
comparative negligence statutes did not 
violate Art., VII, §15, because they did not 
require a special verdict. The Supreme 
Court reasoned that under a general ver-
dict, the jury must know the effect of its 
answers to special findings, and that if the 
jury did not know the effect of its answers, 
the verdict would be a special verdict that 
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would violate Okla. Const. Art., VII, §15. 
1977 OK 91, ¶11-12, 564 P.2d 1009, 1012-13.
Instruction No. 9.53 (First Alternative)
Supplemental Verdict Form
Specifying Economic and Noneconomic 
Losses
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF ____________ 
COUNTY,
STATE OF OKLAHOMA
 ______________ ) 
 Plaintiff, )
 vs. ) CASE NO. ______
 ______________ ) 
 Defendant, )
SUPPLEMENTAL VERDICT FORM
We, the jury, empaneled and sworn in the 
above entitled cause, do, upon our oaths, find 
as follows:
1. The amount of total compensatory dam-
ages awarded [after reduction for comparative 
negligence] to [Plaintiff] is $ ____________ [to 
be filled in by the trial court]. 
The portion of total compensatory damages 
for economic loss is $ ____________; and 
 The portion of total compensatory damages 
for noneconomic loss is $ ____________.
The sum of the portions for economic and 
noneconomic loss must equal the total com-
pensatory damages set out above. 
2. We further find by clear and convincing 
evidence that the conduct of [Defendant] 
(Check any that are applicable):
____  was in reckless disregard for the rights 
of others
____ amounted to gross negligence
____ amounted to fraud
____ was intentional or malicious
____ none of the above
_________________        _________________
Foreperson
_________________        _________________
_________________        _________________
_________________        _________________
_________________        _________________
_________________        _________________
Notes on Use
This Supplemental Verdict Form should 
be used if the jury has returned a verdict 
for personal injury to a plaintiff of more 
than $350,000 after reduction for any per-
centage of comparative negligence. The 
trial court should specify the net award 
after reduction for any percentage of com-
parative negligence in paragraph 1. The 
trial court should include paragraph 2 to 
the extent that any applicable conduct of 
the defendant has been alleged and sup-
ported by proof at trial.
The second alternative that the Civil OUJI 
Committee submitted to the Oklahoma Su-
preme Court differed from the first alternative 
by including the following language in both 
proposed Instruction No. 9.52 and the verdict 
form in Instruction 9.53 to inform the jury of 
the $350,000 cap on noneconomic loss:
The law provides that the amount of 
compensation for noneconomic loss from 
all defendants is limited to $350,000, unless 
you find by clear and convincing evidence 
that their conduct [was/(amounted to)] 
[(reckless disregard for the rights of oth-
ers)/(gross negligence)/fraud/(intentional 
or malicious)]. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court did not 
include any instruction or verdict form con-
cerning the $350,000 cap for noneconomic 
losses in its order dated March 24, 2014, which 
adopted amendments to the Oklahoma Uni-
form Jury Instructions — Civil (Second).17 The 
Oklahoma Supreme Court eventually will have 
to resolve how juries should be instructed in 
personal injury cases where the $350,000 cap 
applies, but the Supreme Court will require a 
justiciable controversy to do so. 
CONCLUSION
The statutes dealing with the taxability of 
damages for personal injuries and the $350,000 
cap on noneconomic losses present challenges 
for drafting jury instructions because they may 
involve possible constitutional issues. Resolu-
tion of these issues will require attorneys to 
make appropriate records in the trial courts 
and then to raise these issues properly on 
appeal. 
1. 1971 OK 68, ¶38, 486 P.2d 630, 636. 
2. Id. The Oklahoma Supreme Court relied on an annotation at 63 
A.L.R.2d 1393, which indicated that the United States Supreme Court 
and all but one state supreme court had ruled that income tax consid-
erations should not be considered, because they were too conjectural. 
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After the Missouri-K.T.R.R. decision, the United States Supreme Court 
ruled in Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 497-98 (1980), that a 
brief jury instruction explaining that damages received on account of 
personal injuries are not taxable income was required as a matter of 
federal law for all FELA cases in order to prevent jurors from mistak-
enly increasing awards to compensate for the effect of income taxes.
3. See 26 CFR Part 1 §1.104-1 (a). Also, an award of damages for 
emotional distress is taxable if it is not attributable to a physical injury. 
Id. §1.104-1 (c). 
4. The Civil OUJI Committee also submitted a proposed revision to 
Instruction No. 5.9, which stated that punitive damages were taxable. 
The Notes on Use to the proposed revision said that the instruction on 
taxability of punitive damages should be given in the second stage of 
the trial, only if the trial court instructed the jury that the plaintiff 
would not be required to pay income taxes on an award for damages 
for personal injury or wrongful death during the first stage of the trial. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court did not adopt the proposed revision to 
Instruction No. 5.9, but it did update several citations in the Notes on 
Use to Instruction No. 5.9.
5. In re: Amendments to the Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions, 
2014 OK 17. 
6. See Tulsa Industrial Authority v. City of Tulsa, 2011 OK 57, ¶13, 270 
P.3d 113, 120 (“The term ‘justiciable’ refers to a lively case or contro-
versy between antagonistic demands.”).
7. Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 2002 OK 24 ¶17, 45 P.3d 86, 93.
8. See Okla. Const. Art. 7, §4; Okla. Stat. Title 12, §1451; Okla. Sup. 
Ct. R. 1.190-1.191.
9. 2009 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 228, §24. The Comprehensive Lawsuit 
Reform Act was declared unconstitutional in Douglas v. Cox Retirement 
Props., 2013 OK 37, 302 P.3d 789, because the Oklahoma legislature 
passed it through unconstitutional log-rolling in violation of the single 
subject rule in Okla. Const. Art. 5,§57. Section 24 was not affected by 
Douglas, however, because Okla. Stat. Title 23, §61.2 was amended by 
a separate statute before Douglas was decided. 
10. Id. at ¶A, J. 
11. 2011 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 14, §1.
12. Okla. Stat. Title 23, §61.2(C). 
13. 1977 OK 91, 564 P.2d 1009.
14. Okla. Stat. Title 23, §11 (Supp. 1976), repealed, 1979 Okla. Session 
Laws c. 38 §14. . 
15. Smith, 1977 OK 91, ¶11, 564 P.2d 1009, 1013.
16. d. 
17. In re: Amendments to the Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions, 
2014 OK 17. 
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ABOuT THE AuTHOR
NOTICE OF HEARING ON THE PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT 
OF LOUIS J. BODNAR, SCBD #6202 
TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION
Notice is hereby given pursuant to Rule 11.3(b), Rules Governing Dis-
ciplinary Proceedings, 5 O.S., Ch. 1, App. 1-A, that a hearing will be 
held to determine if Louis J. Bodnar should be reinstated to active 
membership in the Oklahoma Bar Association.
Any person desiring to be heard in opposition to or in support of the 
petition may appear before the Professional Responsibility Tribunal 
at the Oklahoma Bar Center at 1901 North Lincoln Boulevard, Okla-
homa City, Oklahoma, at 9:30 a.m. on Thursday, May 14, 2015. Any 
person wishing to appear should contact Gina Hendryx, General 
Counsel, Oklahoma Bar Association, P.O. Box 53036, Oklahoma 
City, Oklahoma 73152, telephone (405) 416-7007.
   PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TRIBUNAL
